Proliferation of Social Media Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Proliferation of Social Media - Research Paper Example This is understandable since most of the worlds population turn to content from social media, such as friend recommendations, consumer reports, and the like, before making what they consider to be important decisions in their lives. People now have an accurate point of comparison and discussion. Therefore, it now behooves the leaders to tell the truth in all their reports, statements, and recommendations. Leaders have also been given a definite advantage by the social media connection that they can no create with their supporters and followers. They manage to get their message across with only a few keyboard strokes, to an audience far and wide. Social media has become the perfect advertising and promotional tool for the leaders who wish to stay abreast of their competitors, or understand the needs of their employees, business partners, and the like. They are no longer kept in the dark about the reality of their business, political, or social situations and therefore the leaders are able to address the issues appropriately as they come to

Chromosome Markers in the DNA Tests Research Paper

Chromosome Markers in the DNA Tests - Research Paper Example Forensic DNA testing is currently performed by using the complex STR multiplex systems. This testing allows the testing of several loci in a single – tube PCR system. A highly variable STR is chosen for the analysis such that they should be within the detection range of 90 – 500 base pairs. These STRs should also be present in the other chromosomes too. Highly polymorphic markers and gender identifying markers are widely used in the STR multiplex systems. All these loci are labeled with different fluorescent dyes for the automated Genotyping. The fluorescent dye is attached to the PCR primers and these dyes get incorporated into the target DNA sequence during the process of amplification.   5-FAM (blue) dye is used for the STR loci D3S1358 and NED (Yellow) dye is used for D19S433 STR loci. By using the two different fluorescent dyes, it was observed that the height and the peaks of the STR loci D3S1358 and D19S433 are similar between them. If we use the same fluoresce nt dye then it may lead to confusion whether the source of DNA is from a single person or from multiple persons because the peak areas are very important for the determination of the amount of DNA. If the sample is homozygous and have only one peak with the area equal to the two individual peaks then it will be very difficult to analyze the results. This is very frequent if we use the same fluorescent dye for D3S1358 and D19S433. Since D3S1358 and D19S433 are similar to each other, the use of two different dyes will easily differentiate them. (Thompson 2006). The specific dye is incorporated into the PCR product and the level of emission of light and the intensity of light emission gives the details about the size of the DNA. The level of emission may vary for the two STR loci but since they are of same size, the emission level will be same and it will be very difficult to identify the two STRs. The factors for choosing the Fluorescent dye are based on the dyes, optical filters, las er and matrix to which it binds. The D3S1358 is 119 bp to 147 bp in size with the average repeats of 15. These loci will accept the blue dye more readily than the yellow dye. Similarly D19S433 is 206 bp with 9 repeats. (Foster and Laurin 2012). This also will absorb yellow dye more readily than the blue dye. The variation in the base pair is thus an important factor for the choice of fluorescent dyes. The peak heights of the two STR loci D3S1358 and D19S433 vary with the annealing temperatures. Similarly the relative intensity of the loci also varies. (Foster and Laurin 2012). First generation dyes were used for the analysis of the loci initially; later the development of the second generation dyes with more specificity replaced them. The fluorescent dyes used for the multiplex were amandine dyes that emits the color when bind properly to the DNA fragments. The fluorescent dyes NED and 6 - FAM currently for the identification of the D19S433 and D3S1358 produces standard results for the different populations in many parts of the world. (Li et al. 2013). Thus it is concluded that D3S1358 and D19S433 STR loci cannot have same fluorescent dye because they have the similar base pair length and produce the same peak. (Butler 2005). If the same dye is used then they will form only one peak but with

Problems of the Credit Rating Agencies

Problems of the Credit Rating Agencies Introduction On July 18th, 2007, while referring to adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) (also known as subprime mortgages) bonds, an executive of the Fitchs residential mortgage group said We continue to be confident that AAA ratings reflect the high credit quality of those bonds. Since then, between 2008 and 2009, 140 US banks declared bankruptcy while the International Monetary Fund now estimates world banks global losses due to loans and credit derivatives to approximate $4.1 trillion. If the subprime crisis has been the crisis of credit, it has also been the crisis of credit rating. Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) (namely the tree major ones: Fitch Ratings, Moodys Investors Service and Standard Poors) have been under a lot of criticism in the recent credit crisis. Indeed, not only have CRAs been accused of making errors of judgment in rating structured debt securities, but also of operating a biased business model in an oligopolistic market. As a matter of fact, bond issuers, government regulators and investors have now lost their blind faith in credit ratings and therefore feel the compelling need to change, reorganize and restructure the CRA current business model and industry. Even though CRAs cannot be considered the sole responsible agent for the credit crisis, they have encountered great irregularities and problems: How can they be fixed? What solutions should be implemented to prevent the next credit crisis from happening? How has the credit and CRA crisis affected the leveraged finance industry? To tackle this question, we will first analyze what criticisms credit rating agencies have been subject to and what problems have been identified in the recent years. By evaluating different solutions and suggesting necessary changes, we will then examine how the credit rating business model and market structure could be improved. Finally, as it directly relates to the credit market and CRAs, we will study the impact of the crisis on the leveraged finance industry, with a special focus on leverage buyouts, buyout debt financing and structured finance. Section 1: Current problems of the Credit Rating Agencies business model Though many other players, such as lenders, borrowers, regulators, issuers, and macro factors, can be associated with and blamed for the current credit crunch, Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have been accused of being the main actors behind the malfunctioning and mispricing of the credit markets. Not only have CRAs been blamed for misrating complex structured debt products[1] and other subprime mortgage related products, but also of operating a biased business model in an oligopolistic market. In this first section, we will summarize these three main accusations and analyze in detail the validity of each argument. Solid and pertinent recommendations can only be made if the true problems have been identified. By analysing Moodys financial statements, we can observe that between 2002 and 2006, Moodys profits nearly tripled because of the growth of structured products, accounting for more than 40% of its total revenues in 2006, and the higher margins charged for these products.   Given the revenues generated, one would expect that CRAs did control the rating of these products. Now, after the default rate on adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) reached its peak during the crisis and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) became worthless, CRAs defended themselves by explaining how sophisticated these products were and how hard it was to rate them. This leads us to question, did CRAs rate products they did not understand? Before the mortgage market collapse, analysts like John Paulson expressed incredulity at what appeared to be a complete mispricing of the structured debt products and began predicting that the market would crash: For me it was so obvious that these securities were completely mispriced and we were living in a casino. I think the other players that were involved in the business got caught up in the exuberance, [] in the competition to increase their underwriting volumes, [] to increase their fees. They were very focused on annual earnings, quarterly earnings and annual bonus pools and with the amount of the liquidity, everyone got caught up in what became a massive credit bubble. (Distressed Volatility 2009) Mark Zandi, an economist at Moodys, noted in a report on U.S. Macro Outlook published in May 2006, that household debt was at a record and a fifth of such debt was classified as subprime. Unfortunately, the economic forecasting division is separate from the ratings division of the corporation. But how could CRAs not foresee the crisis and the flaws of their valuation models? The model used to rate structured products has been criticized for two reasons. First, Moodys rating model for assessing CDOs is a statistical model reliant on historical patterns of default. The main assumption behind this model is that past data would remain relevant, even during a period in which the mortgage industry (and its related products) was undergoing drastic change. Second, the use of this model revealed a large failure of common sense (Lowenstein, Triple-A failure 2008)by rating agencies as very complex securities shouldnt have been rated as plain vanilla bonds, for which the model was designed. CRAs were checking their statistical model, but not the underlying assets. As a consequence, Moodys noted in April 2007 that the model was first introduced in 2002. Since then, the mortgage market has evolved considerably with the introduction of many new products and an expansion of risks associated with them (Mason 2007) and thus revised the model it used to evaluate subprime mortgages. Similarly, in a response letter to Roger Lowensteins Triple-A failure article, Vickie Tillman, Executive Vice President of SPs Rating Services claims that her companys rating model includes both historical data and informed assumptions to assess credit quality. This adjusted model doesnt seem to solve the accuracy problem. Deven Sharma, president of SP, admits [] historical data we used and the assumptions we made significantly underestimated the severity of what has actually occurred (Sharma 2008) Even though one can acknowledge the greater complexity of CDOs and the difficulty of accurately assessing the risk profile of these products, the CRAs defence doesnt seem justifiable given the source of wealth these structure products represents to them. One would expect that CRAs would only provide a service they understood. There is still plenty of room for improvement in their models. Research led by Skreta and Veldkamp (Skreta and Veldkamp 2009) suggests that the complexity of any given asset hasnt increased but rather that the more complex types of assets became more prevalent. Indeed, when combined with the phenomenon of rating shopping, where issuers shop from one CRA to another to pick the best rating possible, asset complexity can lead to rating inflation and biased judgment. As a consequence, failure to address potential sources of bias inherent in the business model of the ratings industry could generate future problems. This discussion leads us to the conflict of interest inherent in the issuer-pay model, the second main accusation in our analysis. The conflict of interest between CRAs and bond issuers has been identified as the main problem because it drives the entire CRA business model. This conflict of interest between rating agencies and the bond issuers from whom they receive fees undermines the CRAs ability to give an unbiased assessment of credit risk. There are two types of potential conflicts of interest inherent in the issuer-pay model that may arise from the activities of the CRAs. The first is that rating agencies may be enticed to give better ratings in order to continue receiving service fees. Since CRAs revenues come from issuers, this conflict can lead to an agency problem. The second potential conflict relates to the consulting services CRAs provide to help the issuer to better design products to meet their models different thresholds. In both cases, CRAs run the risk of the issuer going to a different rating agency, which leads to the phenomenon of ratings shopping. Up until the 1970s, the investor-pay business model of credit rating agencies was straightforward: investors bought a subscription to receive ratings. It was during the 1970s that the business model evolved into an issuer-initiated ratings system where the issuers of securities began paying to be rated. Free riding by investors, leading to a reduction in profits for credit rating firms, was the main reason for this transition. As White (White 2002)observes, this shift also coincided with the rise in popularity of the photocopying machine. Although the issuer-pay business model has been around for more than forty years now, concern over ratings bias only recently emerged. Indeed, the conflict of interest, amplified by the rise of complex structured financial products, calls into question the objectivity of ratings that are critical to the efficiency of the market. (Levitt, Conflicts and the Credit Crunch 2007) In response to these accusations, CRA executives have maintained that the issuer pay model is not contradictory to the efficiency of their business model. It seems that a firm cannot support both issuers and investors simultaneously. In fact, the Report of the Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs during the Enron case[2] cited empirical evidence: The conflict appears to be particularly acute for large important issues such as [] Enron []. In these cases investors desperately need guidance from credit rating firms, but often do not get it because of pressure from issuers, [] and in some cases, SEC officials. (Egan and Jones 2010) However, CRA executives have also asserted that CRAs have nothing to benefit from adjusting their ratings to their clients needs because they have a reputation to uphold. In June 2007, SP claimed that reputation is more important than revenues (Becker and Milbourn 2009) thus asserting that maintaining a good reputation had been a sufficiently strong motivating factor for CRAs to keep their high levels of efficiency and objectivity. In reference to this assertion we can ask ourselves: is reputation a sufficient motivating factor to maintain discipline among rating agencies? As a matter of fact, research led by Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet, Rating the Raters: Are Reputation Concerns Powerful Enough to Discipline Rating Agencies? 2009)has suggested that this argument is only valid when a large fraction of the CRA revenues comes from other sources than the rating of complex products. When the reputation of a CRA is good enough, and rating complex products become a large source of revenues (more than 40% of Moodys revenues), the CRA will become too lax and inflate its ratings. This mechanism builds on a three-step reputation cycle, ultimately resulting in crises of confidence where a single default provokes a complete loss of reputation by the CRA. First, the CRA tries to build and improve its reputation and gain investors trust by being very strict. Then, once a positive reputation has been gained, the CRA issues more ratings and takes advantage of its reputation. This is when CRAs become more lax and the risk of default incre ases.   Ultimately, when default occurs, there is a crisis of confidence: the opportunistic CRA is detected and its reputation is very negatively affected. This reputation cycle, which is also a confidence cycle, explains why opportunistic CRA are hard to spot and why ratings biases only recently emerged as a concern in response to inquiries from Vailiki Sketra (Sketra and Veldkamp 2009).[3] To exemplify this concept of reputation cycle, scholars find that CRAs are more likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions (Bolton, Freixa and Shapiro, The Credit Ratings Game 2009). Moreover, reputation seems greatly affected by competition, as it will reduce the effectiveness of the reputational mechanism for two main reasons.   First, reputation is only valuable if there are future producer rents. As a result, the incentive for maintaining a good reputation is reduced by competition. Second, from a microeconomical approach, if the demand elasticity facing individual sellers is higher in a competitive market, the temptation to either reduce prices or otherwise attract business may be stronger which undermines the quality of output. Therefore, the conflict of interest is not solved by reputation concerns. The second aspect of the conflict of interest relates to the collaboration between CRAs and issuers when designing a debt security. Lewis Ranieri, a pioneer in the mortgage bonds market, once said The whole creation of mortgage securities was involved with a rating (Norberg 2009). As a consequence, starting in the 1990s, CRAs started to offer consulting and advisory services to issuers to improve their ratings; a process that involves extended consultations between the agency and its client. The collaborative process that ensues is as follows: issuers propose a rating structure on a pool of debt. Then, the CRA will usually request a cushion of extra capital, known as an enhancement, to meet the necessary conditions for a specific rating. This practice can be dangerous because it is the CRAs responsibility to ensure that the cushion is big enough to safeguard the product, but issuers will try to minimize this extra capitalization in order to maximize their profit margin. Inside the CR As, consultants and raters were meant to be strictly separated by a Chinese wall'[4]. Regardless, CRAs (namely Moodys) began providing unsolicited ratings and offering consultancy services to improve them. Mr. Arthur Levitt, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, pointed out in a recent article in the Wall Street journal that the conflicts of interest arising from such activities are the central problems with CRAs: [Credit rating agencies] are playing both coach and referee in the debt game. They rate companies and issuers that pay them for that service. And, in the case of structured financial instruments, which make it possible to securitize all those subprime mortgages, they help issuers construct these products to obtain the highest possible rating. These conflicts are hard to spot because transparency among these agencies is murky at best, and currently it is difficult to hold these agencies accountable for any wrongdoing (Levitt, Conflicts and the Credit Crunch 2007) The agencies are aware of the conflicts that are inherent to their business model but they claim that they are doing their best as to avoid them. In a letter to Roger Lowensteins Triple-A failure article, Vickie Tillman, Executive Vice President of SPs Rating Services defends her companys business models and practices: At Standard Poors, we recognize the business model we use may raise potential conflicts of interest. Thats why we have always had rigorous policies in place to manage conflicts, and why we currently are implementing additional measures to further strengthen the independence and quality of our ratings opinions. [] the role ratings firms play in the market [] is to provide independent assessments of the creditworthiness of bonds.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   In order to make up for these practices, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a release in February 2007 proposing rules which would identify the issue of unsolicited credit ratings (those not issuer-initiated), as unfair, coercive, or abusive, and thus would prohibit Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) from releasing unsolicited credit ratings.   Even though the SEC intervention seemed necessary, it didnt change the industrys business model: by 2007, the mortgage boom had already reached its peak. Regardless of the criticism surrounding the relationship between issuers and rating agencies, the fact of the matter is that they were simply bringing bonds to market based on market demand, which clearly indicates a crisis of the issuer-based model. CRAs misbehaviour has played a central role in the current subprime mortgage crisis. As such, the governments and regulatory bodies should take steps forward to correct the current business model. We shall therefore investigate alternatives to this model in Section 2 of this paper. This conflict of interest leads us to ask, who finally owns the ratings? The evidence regarding whether rating agencies bend to the issuers will is mixed. A paper written by contract-theory scholars, Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada 2007) investigates this issue by looking at corporate governance ratings in a market with truthful CRAs and rational investors. They show that at equilibrium, in a monopoly, a CRA will fully disclose information but that issuers may prefer to suppress their ratings if they are too noisy because full disclosure is impossible even when firms have the possibility for ownership (i.e., the right to disclose the rating). Additionally, they find that competition between rating agencies can result in less information disclosure since CRAs make zero profit and fully disclose information on firms that have values higher than the CRAs marginal observation cost. In fact, the current business model seems to favour the banks in their quest to receive better ratings. Dr. Joseph Mason compared default rates for corporate bonds to equally BAA-rated CDOs before the bubble burst and found that the CDOs defaulted more than ten times as often (Mason 2007). While, as we discussed earlier, it may be true that CDOs are much more complex securities than plain-vanilla bonds, another interpretation of the data is that CRAs were much more lax when dealing with a Wall Street securitizer as client. But who can blame them? While it is true that on the traditional side of the business (unsophisticated bond rating) CRAs have a large variety of clients (virtually every corporation and municipality that issues public debt), this is not the case in structured finance. On the contrary, the panel of clients is much smaller and the fees are much bigger. The only issue is that the client pays only if the CRA delivers the desired rating. If they do not, the client can e ither adjust the numbers or take another chance with a competitor, a process known as ratings shopping. Brian Clarkson, former president and CEO of Moodys Investors Service acknowledged, There is a lot of rating shopping that goes on. What the market doesnt know is whos seen certain transactions but wasnt hired to rate those deals (Bolton, Freixa and Shapiro, The Credit Ratings Game 2009). In fact, an important feature of the credit ratings market microstructure is the capacity for a security issuer to choose which ratings to purchase. During this process, a structured debt product is issued and the issuer typically proposes a structure to a CRA. The issuer then asks for a shadow rating, which remains private between the CRA and the issuer, unless the issuer pays to make the rating official. Such choices can reflect both explicit and implicit shopping for desired credit reviews and induce a selection effect in the rating process. Selection highlights the relation between the decision about whether to rely on unsolicited ratings and the potential for ratings shopping, illustrating how different types of potential conflicts of interest in the credit rating process could interact. Indeed, shopping for ratings is a practice at the heart of the different conflicts of interest we mentioned above, as it partly invalidates the reputation argument because there seems to be a trade-off between reputation concerns and the risk for ratings shopping. It also encourages CRAs to strengthen their ties and relationship with issuers, most notably by offering a wider range of services. In an interesting paper, Skreta and Veldkamp (Sketra and Veldkamp 2009) examine cherry-picking in ratings, especially for securitization, by issuers who shop for the highest ratings in order to obtain the hi ghest price when selling to naive or little-informed investors. They highlight the influence of risk aversion in motivating the purchase of multiple ratings. Indeed, because investors are risk-averse, they will try to invest in the best-rated securities for an expected yield without having to asses the risk of every security they may be interested in, and thus rely heavily on ratings. The more ratings they have for a security, the more likely they will be to invest in it. Skreta and Veldkamp (Sketra and Veldkamp 2009) conclude that when combined with asset complexity, rating shopping can lead to rating inflation and thus biased judgment. To support that evidence, Kurt Schacht, managing director of the CFA Institute Centre explained that CRA executives [] were concerned about the hype and insinuation that CRAs easily inflate their ratings in response to pressure from issuers and issuers, implicating the integrity of their process and ratings. In exploring that topic, we were very surprised by the results of our member poll where some 211 of the 1,956 respondents said they have indeed witnessed a CRA change ratings in response to external pressures (CFA Institute 2008). As a consequence, not only does ratings shopping enhance ratings distortion, but it also corrupts the entire rating process by giving issuers an incentive to trick their clients into buying overrated securities. A third and final issue to investigate is the lack of competition in the credit-rating industry.   According to The Economist (The Economist 2007), Moodys and Standard Poors dominated the industry by controlling about 80% of the total market in 2007. The third-place competitor, Fitch, had only about 15% of the total share that same year. The current form of these institutions received legal status when the SEC introduced the notion-barrier of the NRSROs in 1975. The rest of the market is divided among only a few other institutions that have received legal status.   While alluding to the dominance of Moodys and Standard Poors in the credit market, the U.S. Department of Justice has referred to the credit-rating industry as a partner duopoly (Laing 2007). As noted by Jonathan R. Laing, a partner duopoly differs from an oligopoly because the partners in the duopoly do no face fierce competition against each other because ones good fortune in winning a piece of business is typicall y followed by the others receiving the same deal at the same lush fee level (Laing 2007).This duopoly has proven quite profitable, as Moodys operating margin is typically around 50% (if not more) better than Microsoft, Accenture, Intel, Nike or Coca-Cola. In fact, according to Congressman Henry Waxmans statement during the Congressional hearings in October 2008, Moodys had the highest profit margin of any company of the SP 500 index for five years in a row. An important complaint arising from this situation is that the lack of competition permits the main players to shirk, engaging in less effort and research that if they were true active competition (Coffee 2006). It may therefore seem that a free market would ensure competition among its CRAs guaranteeing a higher quality and lower price of the ratings. For that reason, competition from new agencies might create a healthy diversity of opinion, leading to more accurate assessments of debt issuers default probabilities Many scholars have analyzed whether this industry structure contributes to the efficiency of the global credit market. We shall investigate in further detail what seems to be the optimal market structure in the next section by examining the solutions and changes necessary to combating the various issues we have so far considered. Other scholars recognize that the existing duopoly may present risks to the market, especially since the two-rating norm is still in full force. Furthermore, since the CRA business model is reputational-driven business, new competitors may face very high barriers to entry. The CRA industry could therefore not allow for more participants. On the other hand, some scholars suggest that the SECs role in both creating and perpetuating this duopoly by which establishing the status and necessary requirements to become a NRSROs, and an official registry. Since competition can both be seen as a problem and as a solution to the CRA industry and business model, we shall now examine the different initiatives that can be undertaken to improve the overall model and functioning of the credit rating market. Section 2: Solutions to fix the identified problems The subprime crisis has brought to light the poor performance of CRAs in rating structured financial products and reminded investors of CRAs past poor performance in predicting the East Asian crisis and the collapse of Enron[5]. Either directly by regulations, or by market force, there are strong signals that the credit rating business is about to change. The main accusations we previously addressed and the perception that CRAs contributed to the financial crisis led to various investigations and calls for reform. In this section, after briefly presenting CRAs reaction to criticism, we will first analyze the different alternatives suggested by scholars and experts to the current business model and the overall industry structure. We will then study the different reforms and regulatory recommendation that have been suggested to the current business model that would improve CRAs effectiveness and enhance the overall market efficiency. Finally, once these changes examined, from a regulat ory standpoint, we will observe the measures recently adopted by both the European Union and the US government (and regulating agencies), determine how the approaches differ and how necessary regulation is. CRAs reaction to accusations CRAs have responded to the allegations with cries of innocence.   If some rating firms claimed that they did nothing wrong and have indicated that they will cooperate openly in any investigation that comes their way, others   did acknowledge some mistakes and have announced the intention to reform their practices.   For example, spokespersons for Moodys, Standard Poors and Fitch have claimed that their organizations will demand more data and more verification and will subject their analysts to more outside checks (Lowenstein, Triple-A failure 2008) However, some may say that CRAs might have implemented these changes simply to avoid further criticism and regulatory intervention.   Indeed, as Lowenstein claims, none of this [] will remove the conflict of interest in the issuer-pays model .   We shall further analyze the case for self regulation in our analysis. In their effort to defend themselves, the CRAs have sought to minimize their role and influence within the financial industry.   According to a spokesperson for Moodys: We perform a very significant but extremely limited role in the credit markets. We issue reasoned, forward-looking opinions about credit risk. [] Our opinions are objective and not tied to any recommendations to buy and sell (Benner and Lashinsky 2007) The consensus of these critics is that the agencies dropped the ball by issuing investment-grade ratings on securities backed by subprime mortgages they should have known were shaky (Benner and Lashinsky 2007) Rather than accept responsibility for their own lack of diligence, the major CRAs have sought to lay the blame on the mortgage holders who turned out to be deadbeats, many of whom lied to obtain their loans (Lowenstein 2008).   Of course, it must be noted that other groups and individuals share the responsibility for the global financial downturn.   As Laing says in regard to CRAs, they were just one link in a subprime production line that stretched from sleazy storefront mortgage brokers, corrupt appraisers and avaricious originators to fee-crazed securitizers and, yes, mendacious borrowers (Laing 2007).   Nonetheless, as Laing further notes, CRAs must be seen as key enablers in the problems development.   i) New agency industry structure and business model Proposals have been made to improve the credit-rating system and thereby reduce the problems we identified. First, it seems that CRA need more independence. As Laing suggests it, many of the changes implemented in the auditing industry with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be similarly carried out. (Even though one may discuss whether this Act has improved capital markets transparency or not, one must note it has enforced the implementation of internal control, due diligence and transparency procedures in firms)For instance ratings agency employees should be prohibited from accepting any favors (whether it is money of gifts) from their clients and the leading analyst should rotate from a client to another with a certain frequency and should wait at least one year before joining their clients firm (an issuer or investment bank in this case) Laing also suggests that the 2003 SEC proposal, which prohibits the linkage of analyst compensation with new business development, could be reenacted. First, CRAs should be more transparent in two distinctive ways. The global credit market needs greater transparency about CRAs overall rating model: rating assumptions, methodologies, but also the fee structures, and past performance. To be more transparent CRAs should follow stricter disclosure requirements (as mentioned in the Rating Agency Act in 2006). Professor Charles W. Calomiris (Calomiris 2009) suggests that, more disclosure could also be required for publicly traded companies with rated debt when filling in debt-offering documents Particularly, in order to prompt CRAs to reduce or eliminate their conflicts of interest, they should disclose any structuring service or consulting-related activity (and the fees related to such practices) provided to a company in connection with the rating of fixed-income securities Second, there is a strong need, expressed by both scholars and analysts, for a clear distinction between the rating of structured products and traditional debt products and thus different rating symbols could be used so as to avoid confusion. The issue is, not all AAA-rated securities are created equally. As demonstrated in the current credit crisis and as proven by Drexel University finance professor Joseph Mason, CDOs receiving a Baa rating from Moodys were more than ten times as likely to default as similarly rated corporate bonds (Mason 2007). As a matter of fact, despite the identical symbols, structured products typically do not have the same risk profile as traditional corporate bonds. By nature, whereas corporate default can be estimated by very few factors (namely the level of leverage of the firm and its capacity to generate stable cash flows from operations), default on structured debt is dependent on hundreds or thousands of individual defaults [e.g., an underlying mortga ge pool] that are estimated given some distribution. They are not the same analysis so they should not be the same ratings. (CFA Institute 2008) A different rating scale according to the risk profile of the products could be used as to not mislead investors into buying misrated securities. As an alternative, Professor Coffee at Columbia University suggests the SEC could define a maximum default rate for different class of ratings, so that if a CRAs ratings were to exceed SEC parameters, it would loose their NRSRO status. (Coffee 2006) Building on this, the entire rating nomenclature could be changed and ratings could be expressed quantitatively as to avoid grade inflation in CRAs opinions. Indeed, in contrast to numerical estimates (of the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD)),which do have objective and quantifiable meanings, letter grades leave more room for sub

College Success Essay -- essays research papers

Skills That Are Important For College Success University Of Phoenix Gen 300 Skills For Professional Development   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  It seems in the society we live in today, having a college degree is a necessity. Years ago it was the norm for people to just go right into a full time job after high school, if they even finished high school; they did this to support their families. In today’s society a person has a difficult time getting a decent job without a college degree. During an adults working life, bachelor degree graduates will earn about $2.1 million and a high school graduate can expect to earn an average of $1.2 million (Day and Newburger, 2002). This is quite a difference and it puts a college education in perspective. With college come the skills needed to be successful. Every student who enters into a college level program needs to bring some very useful skills with them. The first is the maturity to know that college isn’t high school and the discipline level needs to be higher. The classes on a college level are more demanding and require a whole laundry list of skills. To accompany maturity would be critical thinking skills. According to Keys to College Studying a Lifelong Learner chapter 4, â€Å"critical thinking is thinking that goes beyond the basic recall of information†. The college student needs to question why something is the way it is, this is the way we learn. A college student will get more out of a subject if they question it. Why does that reference need to be cited that way? How does that formula work and will it work if I use it in this manner? A high school student takes something a teacher tells them and for the most part doesn’t question it. A college student should apply his or her critical thinking skills and pull the concept apart. When we do this we learn so much more. Time management is a key skill for college students to master. A person who can manage their schedule and personal responsibilities effectively can make the most out of a college student’s most precious resource, time (Study Skills, USF 2005). Time management goes hand in hand with goal setting. In order to effectively manage your time you need to set short term and long term goals and then link those goals to your values (Keys to College Studying, Carter Bishop, and Kravits, 2002). After we set goals we need to prioritize them to make sure ... ...lement this process in my school work. Thinking through situations instead of rushing in to finish quickly is part of my plan. I need to be more methodical at how I approach my school work and I need to be more disciplined. Discipline is probably my biggest culprit when it comes to school work. I love to procrastinate and cut corners if I can; anything to get things done faster. What I need to do is become more disciplined with my time management and if I do that I will have better control of my time. Once I have better control of my time I can start making more time for the readings that I procrastinate on. I value the college education that I am getting and I try not to take for it for granted. With the rising cost of education in this country and the importance that employers are placing on education. I plan to continue honing the skills I have learned and I hope to learn new ones to make my education that much more enjoyable. The best way I can implement my plan is to become more disciplined with the way I do it. In the future I can only hope that my son sees the value in a good education and is disciplined enough to see it through to a degree.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  

Tourism Development In Sikkim Essay

Tourism development in Sikkim has passed through many phases.At Government level the development of tourist facilities was taken up in a planned manner.The Government took several significant steps. A State Policy on tourism was announced in 1992. Later in 2000,The Tourism formulated a comprehensive plan for achieving a sustainable growth in tourism. In 2001, The Ecotourism and Conservation Society of Sikkim (ECOSS) is a registered NGO and operates out of Gangtok, ECOSS believes in the conservation of biodiversity, local culture, promotion of sustainable livelihoods through community mobilisation and empowerment. It conceptualised and hosted the South Asian Regional Conference on Ecotourism (SARCE 2002) at Gangtok with the International Ecotourism Society (TIES) and the Ministry of Tourism which essentially brought ecotourism into the development profile of the North Eastern States and put Sikkim on the ecotourism map of India. ECOSS has successfully executed the Sikkim Himalayan Hom e stay Project funded by UNESCO under their Cultural & Ecotourism in Mountain Regions of Central and South Asia programme from 2004-2007 for promotion of community home stays in Yuksom, Dzongu, Kewzing and Pastanga through capacity building of ecotourism service providers. ECOSS has been a key player in The Gangtok Water Supply and Sanitation Scheme Project funded by the Australian Government International Development Assistance (AUSAID) Programme under their Community Small Grants Scheme. It has been actively involved in the improvement of water supply, sanitation and solid waste management in Greater Gangtok area covering 55 various schemes and benefiting over 26,000 people.ECOSS has executed the Rural Tourism Cluster Project funded by NABARD for the promotion of community based home stays and ecotourism activities in the villages of Rey Mindu in East Sikkim and Lingee Payong in South Sikkim. ECOSS continues to conduct numerous awareness and capacity building trainings in the ecotourism sector both within Sikkim and in the North Eastern states. ECOSS has conducted a pilot project for the revival of the ancient weaving practice of giant nettle fiber cloth amongst the Lepcha community of Dzongu. It has also provided consultancy services on ecotourism for the ADB funded SASEC Tourism Infrastructure Project in Sikkim In 2011 ECOSS has been instrumental in creating the Vision Document for Quality Elementary Education for the Human Resource Development Department, GoS.  ECOSS is also currently engaged in the JICA funded Sikkim Biodiversity and Forest Management Project covering the North District Definition related to Sikkim Ecotourism 1. Ecotourism: A form of tourism that involves travelling to natural areas with the specific objectives of learning, admiring and enjoying nature and its wild plants and animals as well as local people’s cultural aspects including religious monuments, while conserving the natural and social environment, and improving the welfare of the local people. 2. Ecotourism Activities: Activities coordinated by a qualified nature and cultural interpreter designed to entertain and educate clients. Examples of above mentioned activities are;- a. activities in mountains such as trekking, bird and wildlife watching, hiking, photography, mountaineering etc; b. activities in rivers and lakes such as angling, rafting, kayaking, photography etc; c. participating in cultural and traditional events such as agro-tourism, handicraft making, fairs and festivals and Himalayan folkways. 3. Sustainable Ecotourism Development: Development of ecotourism in the State of Sikkim, which meets the needs and aspirations of the current generation without compromising the ability to meet the needs of future generations. 4. Ecotourism Assets: Natural and cultural features that attract visitors, such as landscapes, endemic or rare flora and fauna, local agricultural products, local culture including festivals, local folktales, history, historical monuments and heritage sites. 5. Ecotourism Products: A combination of activities and services which are sold and managed through qualified ecotour operators including local communities or individuals. 6. Ecotourism Services: Services including transportation, local cuisine, camping, home stay, guiding and interpretation. These services should cause minimum damage to the natural and cultural environment and promote a better understanding of the natural and cultural aspects of an area . 7. Interpretation: Communication that helps visitors to understand and appreciate the community resources. Interpretation includes facts, but also reveals the reason of the importance of those facts so that visitors are able to understand why the resources should matter to the individual visitors. Interpreter is a person who provides interpretation in natural and cultural areas, interpretation center, parks and etc. Sikkim ecotourism council The Sikkim Ecotourism Council will be an autonomous council as outlined in the organizational diagram. The Sikkim Ecotourism Council will have an executing arm which is the Ecotourism Directorate (ED) working under the Forest, Environment and Wildlife Management Department (FEWMD). The Council will have a local village level operational system which incorporates various Community-Based Organizations (CBO) working in tandem with Panchayat, Non Governmental Organisation, Tourism Development Committee (TDC), Self-help Groups (SHG) and other local people’s representative groups. Members of Sikkim Ecotourism Council are as follows. Chief Patron : Chief Minister Two Patrons : Minister of Forest and Minister of Tourism, Chairman : Chief Secretary Member Secretary : PCCF-cum-Secretary, Forest Department (FEWMD) Member : Chief Wildlife Warden Member : Secretary, Tourism Department Member : Secretary, Rural Management & Development Department Member : Secretary, Animal Husbandry, Livestock, Fisheries and Veterinary Services Department Member : Secretary, Home Department Member : Secretary, Sports & Youth affairs Member : Director, Ecotourism Directorate Member : Person of National Ecotourism Expertise Member : National Level NGO Members : Four Local Level NGO and CBO Member : Travel Agent Association of Sikkim (TAAS) Role of ecotourism council a. bring all key stakeholders on a common platform of understanding of ecotourism activities . b. coordinate all key stakeholders to work on the  ecotourism activities carried and reflect their opinion to the activities; c. establish guidelines for ecotourism, and revise them in consultation with the key stakeholders including NGO, CBO, local communities, tour operators, tour agents and relevant government authorities from time to time as per the requirements; d. ensure that the new guidelines are consistent with the Code of Conduct for responsible tourism prepared by the Ministry of Tourism, Govt. of India and adopted by Dept of Tourism and Civil Aviation (Govt. of Sikkim); e. monitor the activities of ecotourism to ensure minimum negative impacts on the biodiversity and ecosystems of Sikkim. Emphasis should be on the carrying capacity of the Protected Areas (PAs) in Sikkim including Khangchendzonga National Park (KNP); f. evaluate the negative impacts brought by ecotourism activities and existing rules and regulations, and review and revise the rules in consultation with the stakeholders which have direct or indirect influence to the ecotourism activities as and when necessary; g. review and finalise a draft ecotourism action plan and a long-term development plan which are prepared by ED; h. monitor the trainings and capacity building carried out by ED; i. monitor and influence the activities of private entities which violate the main principles of Sikkim Ecotourism, through relevant organizations; j. request tour operators, guides and home stay owners to provide information on Sikkim’s ecotourism products and ecotourism services, since this information is needed for planning and monitoring of ecotourism activities; Role of ecotourism Directorate of Sikkim Role of ecotourism council is as follows (A) Planning and Development: i. ensure the implementation and execution of the ecotourism guidelines; ii. coordinate with the Home Department, and other related key government organizations in border sensitive ecotourism sites to ensure the smooth operation of ecotourism activities; iii. implement the strategies described in Sikkim Ecotourism Policy; iv. organize seminars, workshops and international conferences among concerned government officials, NGO, CBO, and other stakeholders, from time to time so as to consider the emerging needs/suggestions etc from all sections of society. (B) Financing: i. monitor the revenue generation and allocation of funds for the development of ecotourism; ii. develop a plough back mechanism with an autonomous status for funds generated for sustainability of ecotourism related activities. (C) Operation and Management: i. work in close collaboration with NGO and state level of CBO to implement the ecotourism activities; ii. collaborate with NGO, CBO, TDC, SHG and other local people’s representative groups to implement the ecotourism activities at the village level; iii. set standards for the carrying capacity in the Protected Areas and other Reserved Areas to prevent damage to the biodiversity and ecosystems; iv. publish newsletters, bulletins, pamphlets, status reports and other information and disseminate important government notifications and rules; v. ensure visitors, tour operators, tour agencies and guides to follow the prescribed guidelines. (D) Monitoring, Evaluation and Research: i. monitor the environmental impacts which are caused by tourism activities and plan/take necessary remedial measures to mitigate the same; ii. enlist ecotourism operators in the state and monitor their activities; iii. facilitate scientific assessment of relatively unexplored ecotourism destinations for their potential and promotion; iv. develop participatory tourism monitoring plans in collaboration with NGO, CBO, SHG, TDC, Panchayat, EDC, PSS and JFMC; v. monitor the training and capacity building programmes that are conducted by various other agencies and provide support and cooperation; Strategies for Sikkim tourism development 1 Strategies for planning, zoning and modelling for the Ecotourism sites and other general tourism sites are a. FEWMD and Tourism Department work together to identify the tourism zones and general tourism zones b. prior to establishment of the tourism zoning, plan consultations with the local NGO, CBO, TDC, SHG and other local people’s representative groups as well as key government organizations such as Rural Management and Development Department on the issue of the ecotourism zoning at each area; c. establish zonings for tourism development sites, which will be called tourism zone hereafter,  and general tourism development zone, and differentiate the two zones in Sikkim; d. select villages from the tourism zone and establish a model from each district and focus on efforts on allocating finance, manpower for capacity building and facilities and equipments, and disseminate the successful cases to the other ecotourism zone; e. make some variation of the tourism zone which has specific objectives such as, tourism zones for trekking, tourism zones for bird watching, tourism zones for flower photography; f. regulate the design and appearance of new ecotourism infrastructures such as, accommodations, view points, footpaths, and restaurants that blend with the landscape; etc Strategies for Training and Capacity Building Strategies for training and capacity building are a. train and build the capacity of local communities including home stay owners, youth and women’s groups who wish to engage on ecotourism activities. The topic of the training and capacity building are specific themes such as, environmental education, home stay management, waste management, computing, finance, ecotour program designing, interpretation, risk management, cooking local cuisine, guides for trekking, bird watching, fauna and flora photography, angling, rafting, religious monuments and languages; b. prepare and provide training materials including training manuals, text books and training courses; c. provide technical capacity building for tour operators, CBO, NGO, frontline staff of FEWMD as well as various stakeholders including STDC, EDC, JFMC, PSS and Panchayat; d. identify village level CBO’s engaging on ecotourism activities, and provide necessary capacity building to them; e. identify and review the existing regulations and bye-laws and other regal is sues related village level ecotourism activities. Support CBO to clarify those issues prior to commence the ecotourism activities; f. plan certificate courses for nature interpreters and ecotour guides for trekking, bird watching, fauna and flora photography and other activities; g. identify low season income generation activities to complement ecotourism such as handicraft souvenirs, food and fruit processing, production, repairing and maintenance of adventure equipments; h. provide training and capacity building to FEWMD staff as well as Tourism Department staff within the state to understand the clear  meaning of ecotourism as an activity supported and monitored by FEWMD to be driven by CBO. Strategies for Benefiting the Economically Disadvantaged People Strategies for Benefiting the Economically Disadvantaged People are a. facilitate self employment opportunities for the economically disadvantaged people in ecotourism enterprises; b. encourage supply of goods and services to tourism enterprises by the economically disadvantaged people; c. facilitate direct sales of local goods and services to visitors by the economically disadvantaged people (informal economy); d. encourage establishment and running of tourism enterprises by the economically disadvantaged people – e.g. micro, small and medium sized enterprises, or community based enterprises (formal economy); e. set up systems of voluntary support by tourism enterprises and tourists to the economically disadvantaged people. Strategies for Safety Strategies for safety are; Ensure to have insurance set by all the tour operators, guides, tour agents whose clients may have accidents and injuries during their trip, and guides to carry first aid kit when they are in the field with their clients; Plan training and issuing certificates system for safety including risk management. The training will focus on methods of risk management avoid problems, medication to save clients and quick rescue operation to all the tour operators, guides, tour agents whose clients may have accidents and injuries caused by the engagement of tourism activities; Plan a system of notifying landslides high risk areas as well as other dangerous places for visitors by ED to the tour operators, tour agents, guides and drivers of vehicles through the related associations on a regular basis; Develop a series of hazardous maps of ecotourism sites (places, characteristics of hazardous, etc.) in Sikkim in sustainable manner and update it regularly; Plan a quick response team for an event of any kinds of accidents related  ecotourism activities; Plan a system of emergency call for medical doctors an event of visitors’ sickness or injuries. Strategies for Certification Strategies for certification are; Plan a committee which includes STDC, TAAS, SAATO, TDC, NGO and CBO to work on certification related to the ecotourism activities (e.g. home stay, tour operators, environmental friendly lodges) ; The certification process has to be transparent based on specific guidelines which are monitored through social auditing;   ED, STDC, TAAS, SAATO, TDC, NGO and CBO work together to identify necessary certification items related to ecotourism activities such as renewable energy, ecotour guide. They will plan further courses for the identified items. Strategies for Finance Strategies for finance are; Plan a mechanism of financial system through banks at reasonable interest rates targeting the local people who wish to engage in tourism activities; Inform the financial system to the people in Sikkim including the local villagers;

Disease, Decay and Poison in Hamlet Essay

William Shakespeares Hamlet has been considered the greatest tragedy to have ever been written, in which the theme of disease, decay and poison is embedded deep within the well-known plot of the play. Such theme is developed through the actions, dialogues and figurative language of the characters. These morbid images that are incorporated not only help the audience in grasping Hamlets true emotion, but also play a significant role in characterization, plot development and metaphorical message of the play. Ideas about death and physical decay constantly recur in much of the imagery in Hamlet not only in order to depict the character development and convey Hamlets true emotions to the audience, but also to serve as a metaphorical message on a larger scale. For instance, the imagery of decay is utilized to help comprehend the depression Hamlet feels in his first soliloquy about suicide: O that this too sullied flesh would melt, thaw, and resolve itself into a dew (I.ii 129-130), followed by his comparison of the world to an unweeded garden. This is the first time that Hamlet unleashes his thoughts on the situation and creates a visualization of death. Hamlet thus communicates with the audience putting strong emphasis on his desire not to exist in this world anymore. An image of Hamlets flesh rotting is produced, followed by a picture of a beautiful garden corrupted by disastrous weeds that will destroy the good life. At this moment the audience can grasp Hamlets true emotions as they are able to feel the pain and his yearn for death. Thus, the real imagery about the way Hamlet feels is brought forth. Furthermore, when Laertes comes to the castle to get information on his fathers murder, the hysterical Ophelia pretends to give him different flowers that represent something, but when she comes to the violets, which resembles faithfulness, she says that they have all withered when my father died (IV.v 182). In this quote, the imagery of decay is present because both her father and the flowers have died. This quote is significant to the play as a whole as it is a metaphorical image of corruption and moral decay plaguing not only the characters, but the whole area of Denmark as well, thus foreshadowing the eventual collapse of the nation. This metaphor once again appears in the dialogue when Marcellus states: Something is rotten in the state of Denmark (I.iv. 100), thus foreshadowing the corrupt nature of Denmark leading to the breakdown of the royal family. Therefore,  Shakespeares references to death and decay clearly reveal Hamlets desperate state of mind, simultaneously serving as a political metaphor which implies that the whole state is rotting. Another significant recurring image throughout Hamlet is poison., which plays a significant role in plot development. Poison is also an important theme in the play, which is the main instrument of death. A seminal death image, which brings about the first and most important murder in the play, is the poisoning of Old Hamlet, directed deliberately by his uncle as he lies sleeping in his orchard. Sleeping within my orchard, my custom always of the afternoon, upon my secure hour thy uncle stole, with juice of cursed hebona in a vial, and in the porches of my ears did pour the leprous distilment, whose effect holds such an enmity with blood of man that swift as quicksilver it courses through the natural gates and alleys of the body (I.v. 66-75) The audiences thus run into poison when we learn about the death of King Hamlet, who was killed by his brother pouring poison into his ear. The mention of poison holds a great amount of significance as it is used as a device that leads Hamlet to contemplate revenge upon Claudius. During the players reenactment of the crime in the later plot, the poison poured into Old Hamlets ear reappears. The recurring imagery of poison can be interpreted as a metaphorical message throughout the play as poison is being poured into ears in the form of gossip, suggestions of revenge, slander, evil thoughts that spreads sickness and disease upon the entire court of Denmark. Here, thou incestuous, murdrous, damned Dane, drink off this potion Follow my mother (V, 11, 302-304). Eventually, Hamlet mom Gertrude is killed by a poisonous drink, which is followed by Hamlet, Claudius, Laertes who are also killed by the poisonous rapier. The use of irony and retributive justice in the play becomes apparent when Claudius uses poison to kill King Hamlet and in the end, the same poison kills him, as well as his wife, Laertes and Hamlet. After all, it is the use of poison that starts the story and unravels the denouement, thus possessing an important role in plot development. The somber and dark images of sickness and disease are constantly brought up in Hamlet, and shadow the corruption pervading the recent and future events  of the castle. Throughout such images, Shakespeare succeeds in creating an atmosphere of cold and desolated darkness. Early in the first scene, when Francisco and Barnardo are standing watch, Francisco says: Tis better cold, and I am sick at heart? (I.i.8-9). Franciscos sickness foreshadows the sickness which is entering Denmark. The sickness in Denmark continues when Horatio is contemplating the reasons for the ghosts appearance. Was sick almost to doomsday with eclipse? (I.i.132). Horatio is describing the conditions in Rome just before the murder of Julius Caesar and he believes that the appearance of the Ghost is a portent to Denmark, as the sick moon was a portent to Rome. These quotes are significant because they create an ominous atmosphere for the entire play. In Hamlets first soliloquy, he says: Things rank and gross in nature, possess it merely? (I.ii.140-141). Hamlet apparently feels that the whole world is diseased. The sickness motif plays a significant role in the characterization of Hamlet, as it is extended with questions of Hamlets mental health as the story progresses. Hamlets dialogues related sickness and disease throughout the play reflects not only the outward condition which causes Hamlets spiritual illness, but also his own state. Indeed, the shock of the discovery of his fathers murder and the sight of his mothers conduct have had a traumatic effect on Hamlet to the extent that when the play opens he has already begun to die internally, as all the springs of life are being gradually infected. Therefore, it is necessary to notice the repetitive use of phrases related to sickness and disease in the dialogues, for it creates an ominous atmosphere throughout the play and further aids in the character development of Hamlet. In conclusion, the theme of disease, decay and poison is important throughout the play as it is incorporated with the aim of revealing Hamlets state of mind, conveying political messages, and adding greater significant to the plot development and characterization. Shakespeare successfully achieved his goal through utilizing the dominant theme of the play. As a result, the play has been making a long-lasting impression on the audiences. Bibliography http://everything2.com/index.pl?node=Hamlethttp://www.azete.com/preview/7098www.ibiblio.org/schools/rls/garner/britishlit/hamlet.pdf